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With the rapid increase of public demand, the public service system must keep the 
pace with it as soon as possible. During this important process, the roles government 
palyed shouldn’t be ignored. Not only should we pay attention to whether the 
government supply public goods, but more important, we should think over the 
affection of the governmental behavior on the private contribution. There are two 
different theories about the supply of public goods: governmental provision and 
private contribute. However, based on the assumption of private contribution, this 
paper discusses the affection of the governmental behavior on the provision of public 
in economy. 
The problems analyzed in the paper include: (1) whether does the government 
affect consumers’ private contributions on public goods? Especially whether is 
aggregate supply changed? (2) If consumers “vote by feet”, whether does the 
government realize Pareto improvement? (3) How to deal with the relationships 
between the central and regional governments? 
Firstly, the paper emphasizes the impendence of demand for public goods and 
service and necessity of governmental adjustment in the process of effective supply of 
public goods. Based on concepts and theories of public goods, a mathematical model is 
built to demonstrate the neutralization of governmental policy in the supply of them. 
The difference of governmental behaviors is embodied in the policy of subsidy and tax 
schemes and the governmental roles, which leads to different results. Afterwards, with 
the assumption of free population mobility in a model with two periods and two 
regions, the government could maximize social welfare. Finally, policy suggestions are 
put forward. 
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(1) 生产成本递减；(2) 外部性；(3) 联合供给；(4) 非排他性；(5) 不可
拒绝性，或者叫强制性；(6) 收益外溢；(7) 补偿的不可实施性；(8) 不可分割
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